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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATION
CHARLES S. RHYNE*
I. INTRODUCTION

As creatures of the states, our municipalities occupy a unique position
in our governmental scheme. Not endowed with sovereignty, the municipality
possesses no inherent powers, and can only do that which is authorized by
the state.' The exercise of local powers, therefore, becomes the exercise of
those powers which have been conferred upon it by state legislative action.
Possible exceptions to this are those states in which "home rule" has been
constitutionally conferred upon municipalities, by which authority to form
local governments and to administer municipal affairs in the manner desired
by the local electorate prevails.2 In view of the fact, however, that every
action taken by a nonhome-rule municipality or any of its officers, agents
or departments amounts to an exercise of a power which is derived, expressly
or impliedly, from a statute, it is patent that the construction of such statutes
is of paramount importance to cities, for through such construction the
3
legality of local action is determined.
The organic law of a municipality is found in its charter or applicable
state statutes. Except in home-rule jurisdictions where the authority to frame
charters is vested in the people of the city, local charters are state statutes
which spell out the bounds of permissible municipal action. Other state legislation, not necessarily in the form of charter grants of authority, frequently
outlines further limits within which municipal action must be confined. The
* Member of District of Columbia Bar; author, LABOR

UNIONS AND

MUNICIPAL

E PLOYEE LAW (1946), AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW (1947), and other books and articles:
editor, MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN ACTION (1938 to date).
1. 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 367 (2d ed. 1940). Compare the cases
cited infra note 3.
2. For example, Section 6, Article XX, of the Colorado Constitution provides in part:
"The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants as determined by the last preceding census taken under the authority of the
United States, the State of Colorado or said city or town, are hereby vested with, and
they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city
or town, which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede
within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the
state in conflict therewith."
3. Insofar as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is concerned,
municipal action is "state" sovereign action. "[M]unicipal ordinances adopted under state
authority constitute state action and are within the prohibition of the amendment." Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938). See also Cuyahoga
River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U.S. 462, 36 Sup. Ct. 402, 60 L. Ed. 743 (1916) ; Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 33 Sup. Ct. 312, 57 L. Ed. 510
(1913) ; and Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co, 207 U.S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L.
Ed. 78 (1907).
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interpretation and construction of these enabling statutes, therefore, plays
a vital role in the administration of municipal affairs.
The need for local self-government which is synonymous with the right
of cities to frame and adopt their own charters under state constitutional
authority, and the power to legislate freely on matters of local concern is
clearly demonstrated in the thousands of decisions pertaining to municipal
corporations that are rendered each year by the highest courts of the 48
states. In well over a majority of these decisions the basic question is whether
or not the authority of the municipality to act exists. It might be appropriate,
therefore, to examine a few of the more recent decisions to determine why
powers have been so frequently construed against municipalities in certain
cases.
Because the law of municipal corporations is so completely interwoven
with statutory construction, and is, to a large degree, dominated by it, certain limitations upon the scope of this paper are obviously necessary. The
phase of the problem chosen for discussion is that of conflicts between state
and local legislation. The reasons for selecting this phase of the statutory
construction problem are dual. In the first place, an increasing emphasis
upon intergovernmental relationships has arisen in recent years. Our intricate society necessitates liaison and cooperation between our different levels
of government, and these relations have undeniably created legal problems
of great importance to these levels of government. The second reason for
adopting this approach was the relative absence of any recent analysis of the
matter of conflict between state and local legislation.
The method of considering this problem is, of course, important and it
is believed that study of the actual decisions of the courts is necessary in
order to properly evaluate and analyze the principles which have been applied.
It should be pointed out that irrespective of the desire for comprehensive
treatmeht, self-imposed limitations as to scope are essential in order that the
subject may be considered with some degree of conciseness.
It is a familiar doctrine that where the Federal Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon Congress to regulate certain activities, and a clear
need exists for a uniform national policy respecting such activities, then it is
improper for the states to legislate upon such matters even though the Federal Government has remained silent. In other situations, where there is no
clear need for a uniform national policy, and the Federal Government has
remained silent, state action may be permissible. But where the Federal
Government has spoken, then greater limitations on state action immediately
come into play.4 These principles apply to some extent to the relationships
between states and municipalities.
4. The test as to whether federal action excludes all former and prevents all future
state action has been whether Congress had definitely intended such exclusiveness or not.
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Trends in the judicial application of these principles have been toward
a further limitation of local power. Conflicts between state and municipal
legislation provide but a single phase of the manifold problems of statutory
construction and interpretation, but they do afford an interesting aspect of
the law of statutory construction as applied to municipalities.
What is or is not permissible municipal action by ordinance is always
more difficult to determine where the state has taken a legislative position
with respect to the same subject matter. The mere fact, however, that a state
has regulated a certain endeavor does not necessitate an automatic conclusion
to the effect that a municipality is foreclosed from action relating to the same
field of endeavor. The basic principle which must be borne in mind is that
a local ordinance cannot prohibit that which a state statute allows nor can a
local ordinance permit that which a state statute forbids. As sound as the
basic principle may be, its application has been regrettably mechanical.
Accepting the materiality of the principle with reference to a given factual situation, the next step is to determine what is "prohibited" or what is
"permitted" by both the statute and ordinance under consideration. This step
is actually the determinative one and once mastered requires only a formalistic
application of the principle. But so many of the decisions have not bothered
to reach the "determinative" step. They have been merely content to apply
the principle without heeding its refinements, which are so necessary for its
proper application.
To demonstrate that the application of the principle is and can be frequently misdirected is not difficult. To reduce an example to an obvious situation, assume that a state enacts a statute which "prohibits" the operation of
motor vehicles at a rate of speed in excess of 25 miles per hour in certain
urban areas. Assume further that a municipality in the same state adopts an
ordinance which "prohibits" a speed in the same area in excess of 15 miles
per hour on a street adjacent to a public school. Disregarding the basic question of whether the municipality has the legal authority to act in this matter,
is the ordiriance void for its difference or conflict with the state statute? Applying our principle, we find that the ordinance "permits" nothing prohibited
See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350, 53 Sup. Ct. 611, 77 L. Ed. 1245 (1933), where,
with reference to a state requirement that cattle brought into such state must be certified
to be free from Bang's disease and its alleged conflict with the Federal Cattle Contagious
Disease Act of 1903, the Court said: "The purpose of Congress to supsersede or exclude
state action against the ravages of the disease is not lightly to be inferred. The intention
so to do must definitely and clearly appear." For other Supreme Court decisions concerned with the concurrent and exclusive powers of the Federal and State governments,

see California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 Sup. Ct. 841 (1949) ; California v. Thompson,
313 U.S. 109, 61 Sup. Ct. 930, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941); Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 438, 83 L. Ed. 500 (1939) ; Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273
U.S. 341, 47 Sup. Ct. 383, 71 L. Ed. 672 (1927) ; Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671,
34 Sup. Ct. 756, 58 L. Ed. 1149, 52 L.R.A. (x.s.) 266 (1914) ; McDermott v. Wisconsin,

228 U.S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. 431, 57 L. Ed. 754, 47 L.R.A. (N.s.) 984, Ann. Cas. 1915A
39 (1913).
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by the state, for the ordinance is entirely prohibitory in character. But does
it prohibit something that the statute allows? No, because the statute likewise
is prohibitory and not permissive.
But, suppose that by judicial interpretation it is held that the statute is
not prohibitory, but "permits" a rate of speed up to 25 miles per hour. With
this approach, we reach a conclusion exactly opposite to the one just reached,
for we now find that the ordinance "prohibits" something which the statute
allows, namely, travelling between 15 and 25 miles per hour.
We find, therefore, that it is of paramount importance to determine, in
the first instance, just what the statute and ordinance "permit" or "prohibit."
This determination must be reached not by a mere interplay of words, which
would permit the adoption of either conclusion, but through an examination
of the language employed in the statute and ordinance, the purpose for which
they were enacted, the evils at which they were aimed, and the manner in
which the state and local legislators have fashioned their laws.
The pitfalls into which some courts have fallen because of mechanical
treatment of the principle, despite its fundamental soundness, are all too
clearly revealed in a case study covering recent years. Even in home-rule
jurisdictions, the question exists because what a city council may deem to
be a "local" matter 5 may be held to be a "state" affair 6 so as to nullify local
action.
II. STATE PRE-EMPTION OF THE FIELD TO
THE ABSOLUTE EXCLUSION OF CITIES

The conflicts which have been found to exist where the state has so
5. "Local affairs" have been defined as "those public affairs which alone concern
the inhabitants of the locality as an organized community apart from the people of the
state at large, as supplying purely municipal needs and conveniences and the enforcement
of by-laws and ordinances of a strict local character limited to the interests of the city
residents." 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIrOS § 196 (2d ed. 1940). The question
arises principally in home-rule jurisdictions. Municipal affairs have been held to include
the opening and maintenance of public streets, Black v. Southern Pacific Co., 124 Cal.
App. 321, 12 P.2d 981 (1932); administration of police relief and pension funds, Cincinnati v. Gamble, 64 Ohio App. 313, 28 N.E.2d 676 (1940); advertisement of city's
advantages, Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. 1, 164 P.2d 598 (1945);
administration of local health affairs, Fisher v. Kelly, 264 App. Div. 596, 36 N.Y.S.2d
497 (4th Dep't 1942); and assessment and collection of street paving costs, Berry v.
McCormick, 91 Okla. 211, 217 Pac. 392 (1923), to enumerate a very few.
6. "State affairs" have been defined as' "Public matters concerning the people of
the state at large in common with the inhabitants of the given community. . . ." 1
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 195 (2d ed. 1940). "State affairs" have been
held to include the administration of justice, Fortune v. Civil Service Comm'n, 138 Ohio
St. 385, 35 N.E.2d 442 (1941); the creation of rights between citizens, Sluder v. St.
Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, 88 S.W. 648, 5 L.R.A. (N.s.) 186 (1905) ; tort liability
of a municipality, Helbach v. City of Long Beach, 50 Cal. App. 2d 242, 123 P.2d 62
(1942) ; the care of neglected and delinquent children, Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake
City, 42 Utah 548, 134 Pac. 560 (1913); regulation of banks, New Rochelle Trust, Co.
v. White, 283 N.Y. 223, 28 N.E.2d 387 (1940) ; the mediation of labor disputes, Local
Union No. 876, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. State Labor Mediation Board, 294 Mich. 629, 293 N.W. 809 (1940) ; the destruction of public records, Ex
parte Shaw, 32 Cal. App.2d 84, 89 P.2d 161 (1939) ; and control of the free public school
system, State v. Commings, 47 Okla. 44, 147 Pac. 161 (1915). This enumeration is merely
illustrative, not complete.
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completely pre-empted a field, according to judicial interpretation, that any
local power, however exercised, must fall, present the most serious aspect
of this problem, because of the denial of the city's right to act in any respect.
7
The result reached in the case of Ray v. City and County of Denver,
decided in 1942 by the Colorado Supreme Court may be open to question, but
at least the principle set forth above was not applied in a mechanical fashion.
In this case, a local ordinance' was held void as in irreconcilable conflict with
a state statute on the same subject matter. The ordinance fixed a lower rate
of interest to be charged on small loans than that prescribed by state law. In
approaching the solution to the question, the court was cautious in specifying
the criterion for determining whether or not conflict existed when it stated:
"... it seems evident that in the final analysis the courts revert to the determination of
what might be called the factual question of whether the ordinance forbids the doing
of a thing which the statute authorizes. Since the challenged ordinance, as was its
purpose, forbade the collection in Denver of the charges specified in the state law,
the resolution of the question submitted necessarily hinges upon the ascertainment of
whether the state law conferred authority, as a matter of right, on licensees thereunder
to collect the charges therein designated, or whether, as the city contends, the statute
merely fixed the regulatory ceiling for such rates below which it was free to impose
more strict requirements." '

After examining the statute, the court asserted that it "grants a right"
to do the things enumerated therein, including the right to collect interest at
a rate not to exceed 10%y per annum "except as authorized by this Act." The
ordinance sought to prescribe an 8% interest rate. Inasmuch as the statute
was held to grant a right the ordinance was found conflicting in view of its
prohibitory character, since it forbade the collection of interest at a rate in
excess of 8%. The ordinance therefore was found to prohibit that which the
statute permitted.
While the application of the principle in the Ray case is not believed to
be misdirected, it is not difficult to demonstrate the pitfalls and entanglements
into which courts could fall when the principle is attempted to be applied in a
mechanical or perfunctory manner. Assume, for example, that the state statute
in the Ray case had been interpreted to "prohibit" the receipt of interest
rates by loan brokers in excess of 10%o and assume that the municipality had
adopted an ordinance which prohibited the receipt of interest rates in excess
of 8%. Is the ordinance void for its difference or its so-called conflict with
the statute? Applying the principle we find that the ordinance "permits"
nothing prohibited by the statute for the ordinance, as the statute, is entirely
prohibitory. With the conclusion, however, that the statute "permits" something, the application of the principle results in a directly opposite conclusion
7. 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886, 138 A.L.R. 1485 (1942).
8. 121 P.2d at 888 (italics added).
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for we now observe that the ordinance "prohibits" something which the statute
"permits."
The refinements of the principle which we have seen applied by the
Colorado Supreme Court have been expressed by other authorities. For example, the following statement has been made:
"In order that there be a conflict between a state exiactment and a municipal regulation
both must contain either express or implied conditions which are inconsistent and irreconcilable with such other." '
And another authority has stated:
"Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitoiy and the only difference
between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition, but not counter to
the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize
by the ordinance what the legislature has prohibited or forbid what the legislature has
expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the
the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and
be effective." 10
Further illustrative of the type of decision wherein the state was held

to have completely dominated the field so as to oust municipal authority is
the case of City of Lynchburg v. Dominion Theatres," where it was held that
a city could not forbid the showing of a motion picture which had received
a permit from the state-created board of censorship.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia there held that the state
"'having occupied the entire field of moving picture censorship, municipalities are thereby excluded therefrom as to matters comprehended by the
statute.'" 12 The court found that no local regulations could exist in view of
the comprehensive treatment which the problem of motion picture censorship
had received from the state legislature. In the decision, it was stated:
"If municipalities may censor films and determine the right of the owner to exhibit
them then the unified control plan as outlined in the State statutes would be ineffectual
and inoperative to carry out the expressed intention of the legislature." 1

The intention of the state to occupy the entire field, the court held, was
found "in the very statutes themselves when considered as a whole."
In People v. McDaniel,'4 the court observed that a local ordinance on
the subject matter of regulating the use of motorboats on a certain lake in
the city would have been valid were it not for the existence of pre-emptive
state legislation. The ordinance in question prohibited the use of all motor9. 43 C.J., Municipal Corporations § 220(b) (1927).

10. 37 Am. Jua., Municipal Corporations § 165 (1941).
11.
12.
13.
14.

175 Va. 35, 7 S.E.2d 157, 126 A.L.R. 1358 (1940).
7 S.E.2d at 159-60.
Id. at 160.
303 Mich. 90, 5 N.W.2d 667 (1942).

1950 ]

STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATION

boats having gasoline or internal combustion engines of greater than five
horsepower except when specially authorized on days of celebration or holidays. The statute specified requirements such as mufflers, underwater exhausts and keeping such mufflers and exhausts in proper working order for
all motorboats operating in inland waters of the state.
In holding that the ordinance prohibited that which was permitted by
state law, the court recognized that motorboat noises would be most likely
to disturb the peace and quiet of those living nearby, and that ordinary police
powers would provide a basis for the regulation. The conflict, however,
resulted in a declaration that the ordinance was void. It is believed that this
decision was erroneously decided as the court failed to give proper weight to
local conditions not contemplated by the state legislature.
The -refinements of the principle were apparently unobserved in the case
of City of Harlan v. Scott,15 where a local ordinance which forbade the operation of a motion picture slow on Sundays after 6 P.m. was held to be conflicting with a statute which provided that the operation of a moving picture
show should not be construed as a work, labor, trade, business or calling
within the meaning of the state law prohibiting Sunday labor.
This case again presented an opportunity to examine the extent to which
local requirements, stricter than those of the state, could be imposed. Such
stricter local requirements, however, were merely concluded to be inconflict,
the court stating:
"An ordinance may cover an authorized field of local laws not occupied by general
laws but cannot forbid what a statute expressly permits and may not run counter to
the public policy of the state as declared by the Legislature." 1
The decision, however, appeared to turn on the reasonableness of the
ordinance, for the court later stated:
"... the closing hour provided by this ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable when
considered in the light of the legislative declaration of public policy revealed in the
1934 amendment to Section 1321." '
Confusion as to "unreasonableness" on the one side and "conflict" with
state law on the other should not exist, as these arguments are distinctly independent. If the ordinance in the above case conflicts with the state statute,
then it is void for that reason. If it is unreasonable, then' it likewise is void,
but because it is unreasonable. These two attacks on local measures should be
considered separately as different principles of law, apply to each. As the
statute in the Scott case appears to be permissive, and the ordinance prohibitory, the overall result seems to be correct.
15. 290 Ky. 585, 162 S.W.2d 8 (1942).
16. 162 S.W.2d at 9.
17. Id. at 10.
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In Pipoly v. Benson,'8 decided by the Supreme Court of California, we
observe a further instance in which state action was held to be exclusive and
would preclude municipal regulation of the same matter. The ordinance in
this case provided that no pedestrian should cross a roadway other than by a
crosswalk in a central traffic district or in any business district. The Vehicle
Code of the state provided that:
"Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way
to all vehicles upon the roadway." "
The question was whether or not the ordinance conflicted with the code
because it (the ordinance) prohibited a pedestrian from crossing, while the
statute merely imposed an obligation upon the pedestrian to yield the rightof-way.
After reciting the general doctrine of "municipal affairs" 20 prevailing
in California under their constitutional home rule, the court observed that
additional local regulations not in conflict with the general law may be applied
where the necessities of the particular locality would seem to require such
additional regulation. However, the court noted an exception to this rule
prohibiting an ordinance from imposing additional requirements "in a field
which is fully occupied by the statute." 21 In this case the question presented
was whether the state had intended to occupy the entire field and in concluding that the Vehicle Code did prescribe a uniform policy applicable throughout
the state and in all counties and municipalities therein, the court quoted the
following section of the Code:
"The provisions of this division are applicable and uniform throughout the State
and in all counties and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or
enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this division unless expressly authorized herein." .2
This section, the court held, clearly indicated the legislature's intent to
completely occupy that field of regulation so that the local ordinance was
invalid.
The extreme in construing statutes and ordinances so as to deny local
power on the ground that state action had removed the necessity for local
legislation is typifiel by the case of Ex parte Gamnme, 23 decided in 1949 by
the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. In that case a municipal ordinance of the City of Shawnee prohibited beer taverns from using curtains or
18. 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515 (1942).
19. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 562(a)

20. See note 5, supra.

(1943).

21. 125 P.2d at 485 (italics added).
22. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 458 (1943).
23. 208 P.2d 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949).
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screens or painted glass in excess of three feet in height from the floor of the
premises so as to obstruct the view from the outside. Partitions between
booths in such places exceeding 36 inches in height from the floor were also
prohibited. The pertinent state statute prescribed certain qualifications for
holding a license for the sale of nonintoxicating beverages but was silent as
to obstruction of the view from the outside and as to the height of partitions
between booths in taverns where such beverages were sold.
The court held that the state had surrounded the sale of beer with all of
the regulations deemed necessary and that municipalities were foreclosed from
further regulation. It stated:
"If they [the Legislature] had thought that further regulations in the cities or more
populous areas might have been necessary, it would have been a small matter to have
provided that such municipality might pass further regulations to control the sale of
such beverages within such municipalities." 2'
In addition the court held that a local ordinance could "move in the
same direction" as the state statute, but that "no municipality may add to the
restrictions or qualifications thus laid down by the Legislature." 25
The court concluded:
"The Legislature has spoken so that there would be a uniform application of the
law in each county and municipality of the state. Evidently, it was the purpose and
intent of the Legislature to fully prescribe all of the conditions under which the sale
of this so called non-intoxicating beverage may be had and not leave the prescription
thereof to a town or city council which might change its mood frequently." 26
In one breath, therefore, we find the conclusions (1) that the state has
completely occupied the field to the exclusion of municipalities and (2) that
municipal regulations may run in the same general direction as that of the
state statute. Under the decision it would appear that municipalities would
be unable to enact any controlling regulation of any nature over beer taverns.
Statutory silence thus becomes statutory prohibition. Nor, for that matter,
could a city "move in the same direction." If it prohibited the identical matters prohibited by statute, the ordinance would not be moving in any direction, and if it attempted to add to the restrictions insofar as matters of purely
local interest were concerned, it would be a- nullity according to the decision.
Here the state had not legislated concerning outside view and height of partitions between booths, but, nevertheless, local power to do so was denied as
in conflict. Applying the principle that an ordinance may not permit or prohibit that which is not permitted or prohibited by the state, it is observed
that the state did not permit obstructions to the front view of a beer tavern,
24. 208 P.2d at 966.
25. Id. at 967.
26. Ibid.
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nor did it permit booths with partitions in excess of three feet, so that, therefore, the ordinance prohibiting both, did not prohibit that which the state
allowed. The decision in this case goes much too far in denying municipal
power.
III.

NONEXCLUSIVE

ENTRY BY THE STATE

INTO THE FIELD

(A) Cases Holding Conflict Exists
Many of the decisions concerned with the question of conflict between
state and local legislation have not been troubled with the vexatious determination of whether or not the state has so completely occupied a particular
field of regulation that any and all municipal action is void. These decisions
are concerned with whether, in fields in which there can be mutual action,
the municipality has exceeded its own proper sphere of activity and has improperly invaded that of the state.
Such situations present compelling necessities for most careful analyses
of the legislation involved, and bar the more easily reached conclusion in those
cases where the state has been held to have completely preempted the field.
In measuring the extent of permissible local action, the decisions have
applied rigid rules of construction against municipalities, and have very frequently denied their power to act, particularly in the taxation and licensing
field. In the exercise of the police power, some decisions have recognized the
need for local authority to cope with problems posing menaces to the public
health, safety and welfare.
The application of the principle that an ordinance may not permit what
a statute forbids was not too difficult in the case of Birmingham v. Allen, 27
which was an action to determine the validity of a provision of the city's
municipal plumbing code which permitted "certified gas fitters to install not
exceeding ten (10) feet of water pipe in connection with the replacement of
any gas appliances." The state plumbing code permitted only certified
plumbers to do plumbing work. The local plumbing law was readily found
to be in conflict with the state code as it permitted something forbidden by
statute.
In holding the provision void the court stated:
"It seems to us that the proviso in the ordinance is plainly an effort by indirection
to sanction the installation of plumbing in the City of Birmingham by a class prohibited
so to do by the state law. The proviso thus interpreted is inconsistent with the general
policy of the state

. . .

and for this reason cannot stand." "

The difficulties attendant upon a question of whether stricter local re27. 251 Ala. 198. 36 So.2d 297 (1948).
28. 36 So.2d at 299.
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quirements could be imposed were, of course, absent in the Allen case, so
that the application of the principle was simplified.
In Bennett v. City of Hope,29 the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down
an ordinance which required newly constructed buildings to be connected with
the sanitary sewer system of the city as in conflict with a state statute that
stated:
"Nothing in this act shall be so construed as to authorize the board of health to
order or compel the building of a sewer by one property owner over the property of
another, or for a greater distance from his property through or into any street or

alley than three hundred feet, to a place where a connection can be made with a
sewer." 3'

The court readily found that the ordinance attempted to do exactly what the
statute "says that it may not do."
In Hot Springs v. Gray,31 another Arkansas decision, an ordinance which
permitted the keeping open of a grocery store on Sundays where two or
fewer employees were in attendance was declared.to be "in the very teeth"
of a 'statute which prohibited any grocery store from remaining open on the
Sabbath.
The Allen, Bennett and Gray cases present relatively simple problems
in statutory construction, the conflicts being rather more evident than in
most cases in this field.
However, in passing to more complicated factual situations, and to
instances in which the alleged conflict was, if anything, more subtle, we
find that the principles of law governing conflicts between state and local
legislation of much greater difficulty in application.
The case of Fieldcrest Dairies v. Chicago,32 is illustrative. In that case
the City of Chicago had enacted an ordinance which prohibited the use of
anything but standard milk bottles when milk or milk products were sold
in quantities of less than one gallon. During the pendency of the action which
was for a declaratory judgment that plaintiff's single service milk containers
conformed to the city ordinance, the state legislature enacted a comprehensive
statute which plaintiff contended established a state policy for the manufacture
and distribution of pasteurized milk, including its distribution in single service containers. The statute referred specifically to single service containers
and specified that they should be "manufactured and transported in a sanitary
manner."
It was the city's contention that the statute did not affect the city's
power to prohibit such containers in view of the clause which read:
29. 204 Ark. 147, 161 S.W.2d 186 (1942).
30. ARK. DiG. STAT. § 9615 (1937).

31. 219 S.W.2d 930 (Ark. 1949).
32. 122 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1941), reversing 35 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill. 1940), rev'd,
316 U.S. 168, 62 Sup. Ct. 986, 86 L. Ed. 1355 (1942).
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"Nothing in this Act shall impair or abridge the power of any city, village or
incorporated town to regulate the handling, processing, labeling, sale or distribution
of pasteurized milk and pasteurized milk products, provided that such regulation does
not permit any person to violate any of the provisions of this Act." "

In holding the ordinance prohibiting the plaintiff from distributing milk
in single service containers to be void as contrary to the public policy of the
state the court said:
"The purpose of the saving clause . . . was to preserve in the city the unquestioned
right to continue in a field which had been entered by the state, and in which, thereafter, each should have co-extensive power and authority... the state, upon entering
the field not only made provision for the sale and distribution of pasteurized milk, but
recognized, permitted and approved the use of such containers and the ordinance is
squarely in conflict therewith." "'

The case of Moore v. Village of Gilbert,3 5 decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, 'was an action to recover $550 paid to the defendant village
for permits to move buildings from a point inside to a point outside the municipality. The plaintiff was also required to pay $220 to the village water
and light department for any expenses incurred in moving operations.
A state statute provided that movers of buildings should do their work
so as not unnecessarily to "interfere with, damage or destroy any.., telephone
or electric power poles, wires, or cables" upon any street, alley or highway.
The statute also provided that the owner of poles, wires and cables should
not be required to displace them until reasonable costs had been tendered.
In holding that the collection of the $550 was ultra vires, the court stated:
"The statute expresses the general law of the state as to exactions of money by a
municipality, public utility, or other owner of property from one desiring to move a
building over any highway... we hold that the action of defendant village in requiring
of plaintiff the payment of $550.00 in addition to the more than adequate sum paid to
the water and light department to cover expenses is ultra vires." "'

In other words, the only thing the village could exact was the cost incurred in changing utility facilities and no permit fee could be collected to
insure reasonable protection and safety to the public from the physical
movement of the buildings. Again, the police power was effectively thwarted
through statutory construction. Actually, the sole question for decision would
appear to have been any alleged excessiveness of the permit fee or the basic
authority of the municipality to levy it.
Several decisions have denied local power because of the prohibitory
nature of local legislation where the state has not acted prohibitorily or
33. ILL. REV. STAT.,
34. 122 F.2d at 139.

C. 56Y2,

§ 133 (1945).

35. 207 Minn. 75, 289 N.W. 837 (1940).
36. 289 N.W. at 838.
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where the state has recognized the particular activity as lawful. The case of
Frecker v. City of Dayton,37 is illustrative. In this case an ordinance of
defendant city had the effect of prohibiting the sale of ice cream and confections by street peddlers on the streets of the city. A state statute authorized
municipalities to license peddlers but forbade the collection or imposition of
a license fee upon owners of products which they themselves had raised and
were attempting to sell. In striking down the ordinance, the court stated:
"These enactments clearly recognize peddling as a lawful occupation. If a city
cannot even require a license from certain vendors . . . and the plaintiff comes under
this classification, it should be apparent that it does not possess the far greater power
of completely destroying such a business."

In King v. Louisville,39 the question was whether or not the plaintiff
was engaged in a lawful business. He was convicted of violating a municipal
ordinance making it "unlawful for any person . . . to sell, barter, exchange
...or to have in his ... possession ... fire crackers, Roman candles, torpedoes,
sky rockets, or any other explosives commonly called fire works."
The statute involved authorized municipalities to adopt "ordinances
prohibiting within the corporate limits the commission of any act which
amounts to a misdemeanor under the lavs of the state." No statute existed
making the possession of fire works a misdemeanor, although a statute did
prohibit the explosion of "fire crackers, Roman candles, sky rockets or any
kind of fire works in any unincorporated town or village in this state."
In holding that the plaintiff was engaged in a lawful business since there
was no state law which prohibited the sale or possession of fire works and
since a privilege tax was levied on the occupation by the state, the court
concluded that: "This ordinance, furthermore, is not a regulation, but a
city-wide prohibition of a lawful business. . . . Prohibition is not regulation
but destruction." 40
These two cases illustrate a further extension of the doctrine that
a municipality may not prohibit anything permitted by statute and in these
cases the device of finding or determining the lawfulness of the occupation was
the means through which the end result of invalidity was reached.
In the taxation and licensing fields there are numerous decisions which
find that local authority has overstepped its permissible bounds and has
infringed upon territory which has been preserved by the state to itself.
While there appears to be no basic distinction between the application of
the principle where local police powers are concerned, and where local taxing powers are concerned, it might be appropriate to observe that historically
37.
38.
39.
40.

85 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio App. 1949).
Id. at 422.
42 So.2d 813 (Miss. 1949).
Id. at 816.
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the existence of any claim of taxing power of cities has been more stringently
construed against cities than has the exercise of local police powers. It is,
of course, well established that where any doubt exists as to the authority of
a municipality to act, that authority is generally determined against the city.
-A recent decision dealing with the coextensiveness of state and local
taxing powers was that of Pittsburgh Milk Comnpany v. Pittsburgh.41 In this
case certain local taxes were permitted by statute "except that such local
authorities shall not have authority by virtue of this act to levy, assess and
collect or provide for the levying, assessment and collection of any tax on
a privilege, transaction, subject, occupation or personal property which is
now or does hereafter become subject to a state tax or license fee." The city
levied a mercantile tax and license fee for revenue purposes. The state had
likewise required the plaintiff to pay an annual license fee for the privilege
of doing business. In applying the language of the above quoted statute to
the local tax the court quoted with approval the language of the lower court
in which it was stated: "If it were not for the three words 'or license fee' we
would have no difficulty in deciding this case in favor of the defendants ....," 42
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: "We agree with this. Those three
words make all the difference and since they cannot be disregarded or explained away, our decision must be the same as of the Court below." 43
Notwithstanding the different purposes of the statute and the ordinance,
the former being for regulatory and the latter for revenue purposes, the court
stated that since the state had imposed a license fee such difference in purposes
was immaterial in view of the unambiguous language of the statute.
Local power was again denied in the case of City of Griffin z,.Firhs't
Federal Savings & Loan Assn of Griffin, 44 where a municipality sought
to levy a license tax upon a loan association in the face of a statute which
forbade the assessment of such associations with taxes by any municipality
"on its franchise, capital reserves, surplus, loans, shares or accounts." The
sole question was whether or not the tax was a franchise tax within the provision of the statute. In holding that the "license tax" of the municipality was
within the prohibitions and therefore void, the court held that the state legislature had used'the word "franchise" in a loose or general manner, synonymously with the term "license" or "'occupation."
Another decision which most strictly interpreted local authority was
that of Macon v. Southern Oil Stores4 5 in which a local tax on gasoline
stations, based upon the storage capacities of such stations was imposed. The
act of the state legislature with which this ordinance was held conflicting
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

360 Pa. 360, 62 A2d 49 (1948).
62 A.2d at 51.
Ibid.
80 Ga. App. 217, 55 S.E.2d 771 (1949).
190 Ga. 612, 10 S.E.2d 34 (1939).
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prohibited cities from levying "any fee, license, privilege or excise tax or
taxes measured or computed in gallons upon the sale, purchase, storage,
receipt, distribution, use, consumption or other disposition of motor fuel
and/or kerosene or other products of petroleum; provided, however, that
nothing herein shall prevent the levying by municipalities of reasonable flat
license fees or taxes upon the business of selling motor fuel and/or kerosene
or other like products of petroleum at wholesale or retail." 46
The court held that the ordinance was void even though it was imposed
merely on the gasoline storage capacity of filling stations since its necessary
effect was to tax the storage of the fuel itself.
In the case of Hill v. Richmond,47 the plaintiff sought relief from assessments of license taxes by the defendant city upon plaintiff as a wholesale
merchant. Prior to 1928, the plaintiff was assessed with a state license tax as
a commission merchant and also as a wholesale merchant. The City of
Richmond likewise assessed plaintiff with a city license tax as a wholesale
merchant and also as a commission merchant.
In 1928, the state reclassified businesses whereby the state license tax
as a wholsesale merchandise broker was required of plaintiff but none was
required as a wholesale merchant. The city thereupon exacted only one license
for the privilege of conducting the business of merchandise broker or commission merchant and the former wholesale merchants' license was abandoned
by both the state and the city. In 1940, however, the city reverted to the
method used prior to 1928 and assessed against the plaintiff another license
tax as a wholesale merchant.
In reversing the judgment of the lower court for the city the court stated:
.where the state has made its own classification of a business that is as generally
well known as that of 'Wholesale Merchandise Broker,' the city is bound to follow the
State, if it desires to require a license for that particular business. It certainly cannot
split the business into two parts as attempted here, and tax each part separately. It has
no power to require one tax on that portion of the brokerage business which includes
buying and selling on the broker's own account and require another tax on that part
of his business which is devoted to selling on commission." "s

The above decisions in this section have been concerned with statutes
and ordinances that were directed toward the regulation or taxation of the
same activity. It is not necessary, however, that the statute and ordinance
relate to the identical field of activity in order to find conflict between the two.
One of the most recent cases in which such a conflict was found where
statutes covering different matters than the ordinances involved was Ft. Worth
& D.C. Ry. v. Ammons. 49 This was an action to enjoin a railroad from
46. GA. COD ANN. § 92-1403[G] (1937).

47. 181 Va. 744, 26 S.E.2d 48 (1943).

48. 26 S.E.2d at 52.
49. 215 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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extending an industrial spur track into a residential zone so classified by
the City of Lubbock, Texas. The railroad contended that its right to further
extend its tracks under the eminent domain powers which it possessed by
virtue of authority of state law was superior to the local zoning ordinance and
in sustaining this position the court stated: ". . . that portion of the . . .
Ordinance which places the strip in a C or residential zone is in conflict with
appellants' authority to select and use the strip as their right of way." 50
In Ex parte lfeans,5' local requirements of certificates of registration for
journeymen plumbers was held unlawful and inapplicable to a state employee
engaged in the work of a plumber at state fair grounds within the municipality
on the ground that such ordinance conflicted with the civil service statutes
of the state which established the qualifications for state plumbers. The court
stated:
"Although the legislature has enacted no statute regulating plumbing, if the city's
ordinance is a valid exercise of power, then one whom the state has examined and
found eligible for employment as a plumber and who has later entered the state civil
service, may be unable to work on state property because he cannot pass the examination
of a city health officer or licensing board. The result is a direct conflict of authority.
Either the local regulation is ineffective or the state must bow to the requirement of
its governmental subsidiary. Upon fundamental principles, that conflict must be resolved
in favor of the state."
52

In Lisenba v. Griffin,53 an ordinance regulating barbershops and providing for a city barber board with authority to grant permits and adopt rules
to govern that trade, was held void for conflicting with the state statute providing that "no local board of health or other executive board for the exercise
of public health functions, other than the county board of health, shall be
established or exist in any county or municipality. Nor shall any municipality
have a municipal health officer. . . ." In so holding the court stated, "this
ordinance is patently in conflict with" the above quoted statute.5 4
In Michigan the same result was reached in the case of Builders Ass'n
v. Detroit,55 where an ordinance of the defendant city made it unlawful
to conduct real estate business on Sundays without any exceptions, while a
state statute relating to Sunday work excepted those who conscientiously believed that the seventh day of the week should be observed as the Sabbath.
50. Id. at 411.
51. 14 Cal.2d 254, 93 P.2d 105, 123 A.L.R. 1378 (1939).
52. 93 P.2d at 108. City ordinances are generally held inapplicable to state property,
acts or employees. See, for example, Kentucky Institution for Education of Blind v.
Louisville, 123 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402, 8 L.R.A. (,,i.s.) 553 (1906), holding an ordinance
relating to fire excapes inapplicable to a state institution; and Milwaukee v. McGregor,
140 Wis. 35, 121 N.W. 642, 17 Ann. Cas. 1002 (1909), holding that regulations requiring
that the work of altering and improving buildings be subject to local supervision were
inapplicable to state buildings.
53. 242 Ala. 679, 8 So.2d 175 (1942).
54. 8 So.2d at 177.
55. 295 Mich. 272, 294 N.W. 677 (1940).
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The court readily found that the ordinance prohibited that which the
statute allowed and while the permissive character of the statute and the.
obviously prohibitory character of the ordinance was not recognized there
can be little question as to the result.
(B) Cases Holding No Conflict Exists
Having reviewed certain decisions which have concluded that the
municipality had enacted legislation that conflicted with state statutes, we
now turn to those decisions which held that no conflict existed. The similarity between the various circumstances in the following cases with those of
the preceding section would indicate a lack of appreciation of the fundamental
doctrine by which the question of conflict should be determined.
Two additional considerations that have influenced the following decisions were inexplicably absent in the consideration of the cases in the
foregoing section. These considerations are (1) whether the ordinance is
identical with the statute, and (2) whether the ordinance makes "reasonable"
extensions of state requirements.
Whether or not one would be placed in double jeopardy by doing an act
which violated a statute when said act is also made an offense by city ordinance
was considered in the case of Ex parte Borah.5 6 An ordinance of the City of
San Francisco made it unlawful for any person engaged in a telephone conversation with any telephone operator, supervisor, or "with any other person"
to use abusive, profane, lewd, bawdy, or obscene language." A statute in
effect at the time made it a misdemeanor to use vulgar, profane or indecent
language within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and
boisterous manner. Penalties under the ordinance were $500 fine or six months
imprisonment or both, while under the statute the penalty was fixed at $200
fine and ninety days imprisonment or both.
The court held that the ordinance was not in conflict with the state law
because "it is broader than the Penal Code Section, which refers only to the
use of such language in the presence of women and children, in a loud and
boisterous manner .... The ordinance section and the penal code section are

not in conflict, not identical, and not precisely the same." 57
As for double jeopardy the court held that where the ordinance would,
prevent a prosecution of the offense under the general state law, it would be
held conflicting with the general law. The decision stated: "'It will be observed
that we only hold that there is a conflict where the ordinance and the general
law punish precisely the same acts.' " 58
As the decisions in the preceding section have demonstrated, lack of
56. 208 P.2d 405 (Cal. App. 1949).
57. Id. at 407.
58. Ibid.
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similarity between the local ordinance and the state statute was either disregarded or not considered.
In the case of Retnier v. Municipal Court of City and County of San
Francisco,59 the plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition to prevent his trial
for the offense of keeping and maintaining a place where draw poker and draw
low ball poker were carried on in violation of the Police Code of the city.
State law prohibited every person from dealing, playing, carrying on any
enumerated games, not including however draw poker or draw low ball poker.
In sustaining the section of the Police Code as not being in conflict with
the state statute, the court stated:
"Neither draw, nor draw low ball, poker is prohibited by state law, hence respondents contend that section 288, Police Code, when invoked against places where-gambling
games are played as it was here, is not in conflict with sections 330 or 331, Penal
Code, or any other state law. We are satisfied that this position is supported by the
authorities....
"...the former [ordinance] prohibits keeping and maintaining a gambling house
while the latter [statute] prohibits prevailing upon another to enter one. Under 318
it is not sufficient merely to prove invitation, but 'prevailing' must be proved.... The

acts denounced by the two sections are entirely different." "
Again, it is observed that lack of similarity resulted in a holding that
the ordinance was valid.
The case of Cincinnati v. Luckey 61 is another recent decision relating
to the permissive scope of a municipal ordinance which regulated locomotives
and the manner in which they could block street crossings. The defendant was
convicted of violating an ordinance which provided that "It shall be unlawful
for any railroad company to operate its locomotives, cars or trains of cars in
such manner as to block a street crossing for a period of more than ten
minutes ....
A statute of the State of Ohio made it unlawful for a railroad car or
locomotive to remain upon or across a public road or highway for longer than
five minutes. The question before the court was whether the extension of time
by the municipality was such a-conflict with the statute that it must fall.
In a decision which carefully analyzed the language of the ordinance and
statute it was held that the city council had not intended to legislate upon
a subject fully covered by the statute as the council "was aware of" the
existence of the statute and that in the use of the word "operate" it was to be
presumed that the council had in mind a different situation from that intended
to be covered by the state statute. The court concluded that: "The effect of the
ordinance is to govern the speed of the train imposing by its limitations a
inininnam speed when crossing a street." 62
59. 90 Cal. App.2d 854, 204 P.2d 92 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 806 (1949).

60. 204 P.2d at 94, 95-96.

61. 87 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio App. 1949).

62. Id. at 896.
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The conviction of the defendant however was reversed because an
6
unlawful regulation of interstate commerce was found to exist in the case 3
Here, we observe an instance of liberal interpretation that would give
full effect to both the state and local enactments.
As has been noted in the preceding sections, municipal regulations in
addition to those imposed by the state with reference to the regulation of the
sale of intoxicating liquors and beer has frequently resulted in conclusions
that the state has absolutely preempted the field of regulation so that municipalities are powerless to add to any of the restrictions created by the statute.
Two recent Missouri cases provide exceptions to the rule of these decisions
and merit attention.
In City of Flat River v. Mackley,64 an ordinance which prohibited the
sale of 3.2 beer at any time on Sunday was involved. The statute prohibited
such sales only between the hours of 1:30 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. In affirming the
conviction of the defendant for violating the ordinance the court applied what
is believed to be the true criterion for determining conflicts, namely whether
the ordinance "prohibits" something which the statute "permits." It was
stated as follows in the decision:
"If the ordinance in the case at bar undertook to provide that intoxicating beer
could lawfully be sold 'between, the hours of 1:30 o'clock A.M. and 6:00 o'clock A.1.,'
we would then have a situation where it could properly be said to be in conflict with
the state law .... However, the ordinance contains no such provision and hence is not
inconsistent with nor in conflict with the state law, and is therefore not void." "

It is clear that the court decided that the statute "prohibited" something
and did not "permit" something.
In Nickols v. North Kansas City,6 6 the court held that the Missouri
Liquor Control Act, while comprehensive, was not all inclusive and that a
municipality could legally prohibit the selling of 3.2 beer on Sunday.
In holding that a city would be powerless to prohibit the sale of beer
by ordinance, the court held that a city was not powerless to regulate such
sale in a reasonable manner and quoted the following from the case of Vest v.
Kansas City 67 with approval:
"The fact that a state has enacted regulations governing an occupation does not of
itself prohibit a municipality from enacting additional requirements. So long as there
is no conflict between the two, both the statute and ordinance will stand." "
The test in this case would appear to have been whether or not the
municipality reasonably extended state restrictions. It is submitted that this
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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cases cited note 3, supra.
S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App. 1948).
at 467.
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approach is sounder and greatly to be preferred to those decisions which
have flatly held that municipalities are precluded from any action simply because the state happens to have legislated upon the same subject.
The case of Brotherhood of Stationary Enghieers z,.
St. Louis,6" is still
another Missouri decision which manifested a sympathy for the relative
position between municipalities and the sovereign state and a willingnless to
sustain local action where there is no real conflict with state legislation,
This was an action to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance providing
for the licensing and regulation of stationary engineers on the ground that
such ordinance was inconsistent with state law which provided that no person
should manage, control, take charge of or act as engineer of any steam boiler,
engine or apparatus who had not the requisite knowledge and ability to manage the same. The statute also provided that any incorporated association of
qualified local steam engineers in any city of the population of 20,000 (which
included plaintiff association) should be authorized to grant certificates of
qualification to all persons who duly pass an examination before a committee
of examiners of such association, such certificates to be "prima facie" evidence
of the qualifications of the person to whom issued.
The ordinance of the city provided for a board of engineers of three
who were to examine into the qualifications of applicants for engineering
licenses. The board was required to grant certificates to those having the
requisite qualifications.
The plaintiff alleged that the ordinance failed to recognize the certificates
-which it had issued under the authority of the above state law and that, theref ore, the ordinance was inconsistent with state law.
After pointing out that the state had not attempted to assert sole control
in determining the qualifications of steam engineers, because of the use of the
term "prima facie," the court stated:
"Interpreting the state law accordingly, and acting under its charter power, the
City of St. Louis enacted the ordinance in question, which enlarges upon the provisions

of the state law by requiring more than the state law requires, but which is in no
sense in conflict with it. The state law undertakes to prohibit an unqualified person
from operating a steam boiler or engine, and provides that a certificate of qualification
issued by an association such as the Brotherhood shall be prima facie evidence of the
holder's qualifications. The ordinance does not authorize an unqualified person to
operate a steam boiler or engine, nor does it prevent a certificate of qualification from
being prima facie evidence of the fitness of the person to whom it is issued. On the
contrary, the ordinance conforms to the same standard as that set up by the state law,
and merely supplements the state law by requiring a person proposing to operate a steam
boiler or engine within the City of St. Louis to obtain a license from the Board of
Engineers. It does not permit what the state law prohibits, nor does it prohibit what
the state law permits. It is not inconsistent with the provisions of the state law, and
both may stand together in harmony." "
69. 212 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. App. 1948).
70. Id. at 459-60.
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Other recent decisions have also sustained similar exercises of local
7
powers. '
CONCLUSION

It is undeniable that many of the decisions which have been discussed in
the preceding sections are founded upon sound principles of law, but it is
believed that they provide eloquent testimony of the need for extended local
autonomy and the need for a new conception of the role which municipalities
play in our governmental scheme. The unfortunate effect which some of these
decisions have had upon cities and the burdens which they have created for
these cities emphasize the necessity for a more liberal treatment of the problems of local authority by both the legislative and judicial branches of our
state governments. The ultimate in desirability, however, is, of course, the
provision of adequate constitutional self-powers, for this enables a munici-pality, faced with peculiar and ofttimes isolated problems which are unique
only to that municipality, to cope with such problems in a manner deemed best
by those who are responsible for the administration of the affairs of such
locality.
State supremacy, of course, is not to be questioned for there is nothing
more vital to our democratic system than the preservation of state prerogatives.
It is suggested, however, that there is serious doubt as to the wisdom of
an automatic reliance upon the catch phrase "state supremacy" in decisions
of our courts where the questions in such decisions have nothing whatever
to do with state sovereignty.72 The decisions discussed hereinbefore embrace
legal questions which are of the highest practical importance to municipalities
and where the problem of state sovereignty is absent, or is falsely created,
there should be no mechanical treatment of the whole question as if state
sovereignty were the crux of the entire matter. Realistic approaches rather
than stilted and doctrinaire attitudes toward the complexities of urban life
in the 20th century are needed to provide the strength and vitality to local
71. Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal. App.2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (1948)

(local gross

receipts tax upon attorneys) ; Springfield v. Stevens, 216 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. 1949) (transportation of intoxicating liquors in taxicabs) ; People v. Capriulo, 89 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sp.
Sess. 1949) (tiling of chicken markets) ; Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Town of Greece,
191 Misc. 241, 79 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (zoning of cemetery property) ; Columbus Legal Amusement Ass'n v. Columbus, 79 N.E.2d 915 (Ohio 1947) (mechanical
amusement devices); Portland v. Duntley, 203 P.2d 640 (Ore. 1949) (bookmaking);
Aberdeen v. Forkel, 37 N.W.2d 407 (S.D. 1949) (driving while intoxicated); Tsutras
Automatic Phonograph Co. v. City of Williamson, 51 S.E.2d 427 (W.Va. 1948) (license
tax upon pinball machines).
72. "Federal supremacy" so as to provide immunity from state action was mentioned

in the recent case of S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 66 Sup. Ct. 749, 90 L. Ed.

851 (1946), holding that a state could tax realty, the legal title to which remained in
the Federal Government, while the equitable title passed to the person purchasing the
realty from the Federal Government. See also United States v. County of Allegheny,
322 U.S. 174, 64 Sup. Ct. 908, 88 L. Ed. 1209 (1944), where "Federal supremacy" prevented the imposition of local taxes upon the machinery of a cost-plus contractor of the
Federal Government, where such machinery was leased from the Federal Government
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governments that are necessary to preserve their integrity.73 Integrity, and
to a certain degree, independence of local government unquestionably redound
to the benefit and strength of the state.
Home rule philosophies have been attempted in a number of our states
and time has proven that there is more than ample room in our governmental
hierarchy for both the state and local government. Both can and have existed
74
without infringement upon the proper sphere of activity of either.
Statutory construction as applied to municipal corporations, therefore,
can be a device whereby our municipal corporations may be permitted to thrive
and efficiently discharge their functions. This device, as observed, has not
always been used in furtherance of this idea. Courts should, however, become
increasingly aware of the trJue place which the city occupies in our life and
accord to it a recognition of its vital role in our system of government.
Examination of mere words in a statute or ordinance falls far short of the
judicial responsibility. Mechanical application of rigid formulas falls even
shorter. Examination of the true relationships between our cities and their
parent states is imperative in all cases of asserted conflict of action in order
to assure the preservation and proper functioning of that form of government
which is the closest to the American citizen.
73. While not directly related to the problem under consideration, it is to be noted

that many ordinances have been invalidated under the "due process" clause of tile 14th
Amendment or similar provisions of state constitutions as being "unreasonable" exercises
of the police power. In the past some state courts have not been adverse to inquiring
into the wisdom or expediency of local legislation and have, in effect, applied sub silentlo
what might be termed a "presumption of unconstitutionality," particularly in the application of state constitutional provisions. Fortunately, these decisions have been limited
in number and the accepted rule of judicial action that courts will not and should not
pass on the wisdom or expediency of legislation has been applied in most instances. This
has been notably true in recent years in cases dealing with what has been denoted as
"economic legislation." The increasing tendency of state courts to uphold local legislation
attacked as violative of the due process clauses of state or Federal constitutions, where
it bears any degree of relationship to a legitimate end, has been, at the least in part, influenced by the "shift of emphasis" of the United States Supreme Court in a series of
cases which rejected the due process philosophy expounded in a previous line of cases.
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934). In discussing what has been termed a return to "earlier constitutional principles," the Court
has stressed that the "due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that
the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket." See the majority opinion
by Mr. Justice Black and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lincoln
Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 Sup. Ct,
251 (1949). The tendency by all courts to return to the true judicial function of refusing
to upset legislation because the court may have doubts as to its desirability or wisdom
has been of practical importance to municipalities attempting to regulate local affairs
under the myriad ramifications of modern society. The principle that legislation should
not be invalidated and annulled as unreasonable unless palpably in excess of legislative
power is the only practical principle consonant with the precepts of democratic philosophy,
for under that philosophy the practical forum for the correction of unwise or ill-advised
legislation is a responsive legislature subject to the will of the electorate. See Daniel
v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220, 69 Sup. Ct. 550 (1949).
74. The experience with, and the need for, home rule has been of great concern to
municipal attorneys who have accorded much attention to the subject. See, for example,
the annual reports of the Committee on City-State Relations of the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers, which are reproduced in 1950 MUNICIPALITIES AND

THE

LAw IN Acriox 329-34; 1949 id. 312-15; 1948 id. 165-72; 1947 id. 171-93; 1946 id. 98-101 :
1945 id. 293-95; and 1944 id. 184-86. See also Adamowski, Home Rile for Cities, in 1949
id. 316-29.

